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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Insurance-Accidental Means v. Accidental Death or
Tweedledum v. Tweedledee*
The insured in Henderson v. Hartford Acc. & In4dern. Co.' was
a member of the local fire department who entered a burning dwell-
ing in furtherance of his duties as a fireman. While inside the
house he inhaled heavy smoke which caused him to collapse. He
was revived, but he died after a few minutes from a cardiac arrest
brought on by the smoke inhalation. The group accident insurance
policy covering the fire department members provided that death
or injury must be "effected . . . through accidental means."2 On
the basis of this wording the North Carolina Supreme Court denied
recovery to the insured's beneficiary, distinguishing the terms "acci-
dental means" and "accident." The insured's death, the court held,
occurred by "accident" and not by "accidental means."
The common definition of an "accident" is an unusual, un-
expected and unintended event-an event which happens fortui-
tously and without design.' In light of the fact that the term
"accident" has acquired no special technical meaning in law and is
to be given its ordinary and common meaning,4 it would appear
that recovery would be had in the above case. The distinction
drawn by the North Carolina court to deny recovery, however, is
also drawn in many other jurisdictions. On the other hand, some
courts, while recognizing the technical distinction between the terms,
flatly refuse to drawn any legal distinction between them. The
* In the poem "On the Feuds between Handel and Bononcini," which
was written about two feuding schools of musical theory between which
there was no real difference, the English poet John Byron wrote this familiar
line:
"Strange all this difference should be
Twixt Tweedledum and Tweedledee."
This expression has a special relevance when discussing the terms "acci-
dental means" and "accident" in insurance law.
'268 N.C. 129, 150 S.E.2d 17 (1966).2 1d. at 130, 150 S.E.2d at 18 (emphasis added). The term "accidental
means" is common in accident policies and in double indemnity provisions of
life insurance policies. See Franklin, Accidental Death-As It Relates to
Health and Accident Policies and Double Indemnity Provisions of Life Poli-
cies, ABA INS., NEGL., & Comp. LAW SEcTION 91 (1965). The two types of
policies will be treated together here since the use of the term has the same
effect in both. For a brief history of how the term came into use see M.
CORNELIus, ACCIDENTAL MEANS 1-4 (1932).
'E.g., 29A Am. JuR. Insurance § 1164 (1960).
'2 G. RIcHrAIs, INSURANCE 725 (5th ed. 1952).
[Vol. 46
ACCIDENTAL DEATH
resulting controversy is no small one.' It is helpful, for purposes
of analysis, to regard the courts and legal scholars as divided into
two distinct groups, but it is not always clear to which group some
courts belong.
The first group, of which North Carolina is a member, follows
the "strict approach" or "Georgia rule."6 This group distinguishes
between the terms and is considered to be in the majority. Basi-
cally, the distinction is founded upon the idea that "means" is syn-
onymous with "cause; ' that when the term "accidental means"
is used in a policy, the cause of the injury or death must be acci-
dental. To these courts it is not sufficient that the result can be
classified as an accident. Under this theory an insured's injury
or death may be an "accident" and yet not caused by "accidental
means." The means are not considered accidental when the insured
does a voluntary and intentional act and is injured or killed, even
though the injury or death does not ordinarily follow such an act
and was not in any way intended or expected.
The North Carolina court's reasoning in the Henderson case
provides a clear example of the strict approach. There the insured
was voluntarily and intentionally fighting the fire. The court held
that the means were not accidental since the insured was voluntarily
performing an intentional act, even though the result (i.e. death)
was unusual, unexpected, and unforseen. s
If a slip or mishap occurs in the doing of a voluntary and in-
tentional act, an element of unexpectedness is added and the means
become accidental.' Therefore the distinction or strict approach
becomes important only where the insured is injured or killed as
the result of an intentional act in which no slip or mishap occurred,
but where the result was totally unexpected and unintended as in
Henderson.
The second group of courts and legal scholars follows the
'See generally 29A AM. JUR., mtpra note 3, at §§ 1164-67; 1A J. APPLE-
MAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 391-93 (rev. ed. 1965); 45 C.J.S.
Insurance §§ 753-54, 938 (1946) ; 2 G. RIcHARDS, supra note 4, at §§ 213-17;
W. VANCE, INSURANCE §§ 179-81 (3rd ed. 1961).
° This "strict approach" stems from the case of United States Mut. Acc.
Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889).
29A Al!. JuR., supra note 2, at § 1166.8268 N.C. at 133, 150 S.E.2d at 20.
' Thus in Henderson the court ruled by implication that if a slip, mishap,
or mischance had occurred in the doing of the act, recovery would have
been allowed.
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"liberal approach" or "New York rule."10 Mr. Justice Cardozo,
dissenting in Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.," paved the
way for this liberal rule by his apparently logical statement to the
effect that an accident is an accident throughout or it is no accident
at all. 2 To the followers of the liberal approach the terms "acci-
dental means" and "accident" are regarded as being legally synony-
mous. To these courts the means are accidental when the result
is an accident. Therefore, when the result is unusual, unexpected,
and unintended, even though resulting from an intentional act in
which no slip or mishap occurs, the means are held to be accidental
and recovery is allowed.
Added to the controversy is confusion. Mr. Justice Cardozo
predicted in his celebrated dissent in Landress that "[tfhe attempted
distinction between accidental results and accidental means will
plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog.18 The con-
fusion that has resulted has prompted one writer to the conclusion
that this "prophecy . . . is now close to fulfillment. This whole
"
0Among the courts following the "liberal approach" are those of Arkan-
sas, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Johnston, 204 Ark. 307, 162 S.W.2d 480 (19425;
Colorado, Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 67
P.2d 80 (1937); Florida, Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash, 97 So.2d 4 (Fla.
1957); Idaho, O'Neil v. New York Life Ins. Co., 65 Idaho 722, 152 P.2d
707 (1944); Illinois, Taylor v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 11 Ill.2d
227, 142 N.E.2d 5 (1957); Iowa, Comfort v. Continental Cas. Co., 239
Iowa 1206, 34 N.W. 2d 588 (1948); Louisiana, Schonberg v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 235 La. 462, 104 So.2d 171 (1958); Nebraska, Murphy v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N.W.2d 576 (1942); New Mexico, Scott
v. New Empire Ins. Co., 75 N.M. 81, 400 P.2d 953 (1965); New York,
Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 295 N.Y. 294, 67 N.E.2d
248 (1946); North Dakota, Jacobson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc.
Ass'n, 69 N.D. 632, 289 N.W. 591 (1940); Oklahoma, Provident Life &
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Green, 172 Okla. 591, 46 P.2d 372 (1935); Pennsylvania,
Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424 Pa. 107, 225 A.2d 532 (1967); South
Carolina, Goethe v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183 S.C. 199, 190 S.E. 451(1937); Utah, Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 94 Utah 532,
72 P.2d 1060 (1937); and Vermont, Griswald v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
107 Vt. 367, 180 A. 649 (1935). Other courts have followed the liberal
approach in particular cases without announcing it as a general rule, e.g.,
King v. Travelers Ins. Co., 123 Conn. 1, 192 A. 311 (1937).11291 U.S. 491 (1934).
12291 U.S. at 501. See Note, "An Accident Is an Accident Is An Acci-
dent. . ." or "An Accident By Any Other Name .... " 12 N.Y.U. INmRA.
L. REv. 250, 255 (1957).
291 U.S. at 499. The term "Serbonian Bog" is from 2 J. MILToN,
PARADISE LosT line 392 (1667):
A gulf profound as that Serbonian Bog
Betwixt Damiato and Mount Casius old,
Where armies whold have sunk. ...
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branch of insurance law has become shrouded in a semantical and
polemical maze. . . . The situation is fast approaching a point
where the slight frame of legal theory involved is being smothered."
Part of the confusion is created by the fact that different courts
following the strict approach will often reach contradictory results
on similar fact situations. The Michigan court allowed recovery
where an insured hunter froze to death on a hunting trip, 5 but
the Montana court denied recovery on similar facts." Another
example is the division among the courts following the strict ap-
proach as to whether sunstroke is caused by accidental means."
The reason for these inconsistent results is that many courts which
draw the distinction have modified the approach in particular cases
in an effort to achieve more equitable results.'" Thus it appears that
some courts have abolished the distinction without repudiating it. 9
Another source of confusion in this area is that the courts which
attempt to achieve a more equitable result often do so by resorting
to a confusing analysis of the case in order to preserve the distinc-
tion. An example of such an analysis is found in Traveler's Ins. Co.
v. Ansley." There the insured died from an overdose of a "nerve
remedy." There was no slip or mishap causing the insured to take
a poisonous quantity. He intentionally took the precise amount
involved without knowing it was deadly in that quantity. That the
Tennessee court professes to follow the strict rule is evidenced by
the statement that an accidental means policy "does not insure against
an injury that may be caused by a voluntary, natural, ordinary
movement, executed exactly as was intended."" Applying this
strict rule to the facts of the case, there would normally be no re-
covery since the insured voluntarily, intentionally, and with an
ordinary movement, took the medicine. But, in allowing recovery
"Annot., 166 A.L.R. 469, 477 (1934).
" Ashley v. Agricultural Life Ins. Co., 241 Mich. 441, 217 N.W. 27
(1928).
1 Tuttle v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 58 Mont. 121, 190 P. 993 (1920).
'E.g., The Landress majority held sunstroke not to be by accidental
means, but the Wisconsin court holds that it is. O'Connell v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 220 Wis. 61, 264 N.W. 253 (1936).
1" Kirsch, Accidental Means, 1953 IxsuR. L.J. 545, 547 [hereinafter cited
as Kirsch].
10 Thompson, The Judicial Approach to "Accidental Means" Policies in
California, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (1961) (suggests that California has donejust that).
"022 Tenn. App. 456, 124 S.W.2d 37 (1938).
11 Id. at 459, 124 S.W.2d at 39.
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the Tennessee court reasoned that while insured intentionally con-
sumed the medicine taken, and in the precise quantity taken, his
real intent was only to take a "harmless nerve remedy."22 The ap-
parent meaning of this is that while the insured intentionally took
an amount that was toxic, in the sense that the taking was a de-
liberate act, he unintentionally took a toxic amount, in the sense
that death was not his desire. In other words, an intentional act
is intentional only up to the point that it has the effect that the actor
thought it would have. From that point on, to the actual result
that follows the intentional act, the act is unintentional and the
means are therefore accidental. It is apparent that this logic could
be used to allow recovery in spite of the distinction in any case
where the insured does an intentional act that has an unintended
or unexpected result. For example, if applied to Henderson, re-
covery would be allowed since the insured there was doing a volun-
tary and intentional act, but he did not intend the result that fol-
lowed that act.
While many courts following the strict rule have become bogged
down in the confusion and have given only lip service to the dis-
tinction, the North Carolina Supreme Court has, for the most part,
been consistent in denying recovery on the basis of the distinction
whenever insured did an intentional act without a slip or mishap.
The Henderson case is only the most recent example. 23 The North
Carolina court has not, however, escaped the confusion entirely. In
several cases the court has employed a natural and probable conse-
quence approach to the problem.24 The use of this approach by
22 Id. at 462, 124 S.W.2d at 41.
3 Other cases include Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 268 N.C. 98, 150
S.E.2d 40 (1966) (insured, without warning, "jumped straight backward,"
hit is head on a cement floor and died of a cerebral hemorrhage) ; Langley
v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 459, 135 S.E.2d 38 (1964) (insured lay
face down on his bed, went to sleep, and suffocated); Allred v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 247 N.C. 105, 100 S.E.2d 226 (1957) (insured lay in
highway to show his companions how brave he was, was hit, and died);
Fletcher v. Security Life & Trust Co., 220 N.C. 148, 16 S.E.2d 687 (1941)
(insured received a spinal anesthesia preparatory to gall bladder operation
which unexpectedly caused a collapse of his respiratory system and death) ;
Scott v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 160, 179 S.E. 434 (1935) (insured had
a tooth pulled and germs entered the hole and caused swelling which necessi-
tated an operation and insured died from a blood clot following the opera-
tion) ; and Mehaffey v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 205 N.C. 701, 172
S.E. 331 (1934) (insured died from liquor poisoning).
"Allred v. Prudential Ins. Co., 247 N.C. 105, 100 S.E.2d 226 (1957);
Scarborough v. World Ins. Co., 244 N.C. 502, 94 S.E.2d 558 (1956) ; Mehaf-
fey v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 205 N.C. 701, 172 S.E. 331 (1934);
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some courts is another factor causing confusion in the accidental
means area because, as will be seen by an examination of the rule,
it is the very antithesis of the strict approach which these courts pro-
fess to follow. 25
The rule concerning natural and probable consequences in this
area of law has been stated as follows:
An effect which is the natural and probable consequence of an
act or course of action is not an accident, nor is it produced by
accidental means. It is either the result of actual design, or falls
under the maxim that every man must be held to intend the natu-
ral and probable consequences of his deeds. On the other hand,
an effect which is not the natural and probable consequence of
the means which produced it, an effect which does not ordinarily
follow and cannot be reasonably anticipated from the use of these
means .. ., is produced by accidental means.26
Examining the rule, it can be seen that the natural and probable
consequence approach is the antithesis of the strict approach since
results, instead of means, are being tested by its use.17  Courts, in
using it, are examining the result to determine if it is the natural
and probable consequence of the act producing it. If it is not, re-
covery is allowed. Thus, if the result is unexpected and unintended
and does not ordinarily follow the act, then that result is produced
by accidental means, and this is in effect a restatement of the liberal
approach.
The North Carolina court has never stated the natural and
probable consequence rule as explicitly as set out above. But, in
Harris v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co." the insured died as a
result of pneumonia which developed from a chest injury received
in a high school basketball game when he attempted to block a
shot by an opponent. In allowing recovery, the court reasoned that
although he "engaged voluntarily in the game .. . , and while he
anticipated collisions during the progress of the game . . . , no such
injury as that which he suffered . . .was probable as the result of
the game."2 In Mehaffey v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co.30 the
Harris v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 204 N.C. 385, 168 S.E. 208
(1933).
"Kirsch 547.
"'Western Commercial Travelers Ass'n v. Smith, 85 F. 401, 405 (8th
Cir. 1898) (emphasis added).
27 Kirsch 547.
28204 N.C. 385, 168 S.E. 208 (1933).
Id. at 388, 168 S.E. at 210.0 205 N.C. 701, 172 S.E. 331 (1934).
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court, referring to poisoning of the insured from consumption of
alcohol, said that "any poison in the stomach of the deceased was
the natural and probable consequence of an ordinary act in which
he voluntarily engaged."" These cases show the court's implicit
acceptance of the natural and probable consequence rule. The
Mehaffey decision, perhaps, is not surprising. Recovery would have
been denied without the use of the natural and probable consequence
rule by merely following the normal strict rule, since the means by
which insured died was an intentional act and not accidental. The
Harris decision, however, would have been different without the
use of the natural and probable consequence rule. There the means
was as much an intentional act as in Mehaffey, but recovery was
allowed. A possible explanation for the court's use of the natural
and probable consequence rule in Harris is that the court had not
accepted the strict rule at that time. But it did accept it one year
later in Mehaffey by saying that "[i]f the result, although un-
expected, flows directly from an ordinary act in which the insured
voluntarily engages, then such is not deemed to have been pro-
duced by accidental means.""2 Despite this acceptance of the strict
rule, the court proceeded to deny recovery by using natural and
probable consequence language.3 8 Thus, it can be seen that the
court was not using the natural and probable consequence rule in
Harris merely because it had not accepted the strict rule as yet, since
it later applied it in Mehaffey after acceptance of the strict rule.
Although the court did not accept the strict rule in Harris, it dis-
cussed it and its acceptance by other courts, concluding that "if
conceded to be sound, [it] is not applicable to the instant case." 84
It would seem that if the court considered the rule applicable in
any case, it would be applicable in Harris since the facts seem to
present a clear case for its application. The insured was injured as
a result of a voluntary and intentional act although the result was
not intended.
Since the court employed the natural and probable consequence
rule in Harris where the facts seem to call for application of the
strict rule, it is not clear why it failed to employ the rule in other
11d. at 705, 172 S.E. at 333.
2 Id. at 705, 172 S.E. at 333.
'OId. at 705, 172 S.E. at 333.
,204 N.C. at 388, 168 S.E. at 210.
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cases.8 5  As much confusion as the approach has caused, however,
it does provide a means of achieving a fair result without the neces-
sity of repudiating the strict rule.36
There seem to be only three possible justifications for distin-
guishing between the terms "accidental means" and "accident."
The first is that the parties are free to contract as they desire."
This argument has lost its appeal in insurance cases and the Utah
court disposed of it properly in Browning v. Equitable Life Ass.
Soc.88 by stating that
[i]nsurance policies, while in the nature of written contracts, are
not prepared after negotiations between the parties, to embrace
the terms at which the parties have arrived.... They are prepared
beforehand by the insurer. Normally, the details and provi-
sions are not discussed. He seldom sees the policy until it has
been issued and delivered to him. He signs an application blank
in which the policy sought is described either by form number or
by general designation, pays his premium, and in due course
thereafter receives... his policy. Many of the terms and all of its
defenses and super-refinements he has never heard of and would
not understand them if he read them .... 9
The second possible justification is that there is a technical dif-
ference between the terms. They are not in fact synonymous. But,
insurance policies do not give the reader an opportunity to distin-
guish between the terms. Policies do not say that "coverage is
provided against death or injury by 'accidental means'-as opposed
to death or injury by 'accident.' " They contain only the term
"accidental means" or the term "accident," not both. The average
" If it were applied to other North Carolina cases where the strict rule
was applied and recovery was denied, recovery could have been allowed
and a more equitable result achieved. For instance if applied to Fletcher v.
Security Life & Trust Co., 220 N.C. 148, 16 S.E.2d 687 (1941), recovery
would surely be allowed since a collapse of the respiratory system and death
are not the natural and probable consequences of a normal spinal anesthesia;
neither is death the natural and probable result of a tooth extraction as
occurred in Scott v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 160, 179 S.E. 434 (1935) ;
nor is death the natural and probable consequence of a fireman fighting an
ordinary fire in an ordinary manner with no great risks taken, as occurred in
Henderson.
" This fair result is attained by merely not applying it. The Texas court
uses this natural and probable consequence analysis in accidental means cases
although it purports to follow the strict rule, e.g., Perry v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 380 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
'31 N.C.L. REv. 319, 324 (1953).
"94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060 (1937).
"Id. at 561-62, 72 P.2d at 1073.
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person would not stop to distinguish between the terms upon seeing
one of them, although he probably would if he saw them together.
Even if the insured realized that there is a distinction between the
terms, that they are not the same, he would not know of the legal
ramifications of this distinction.
And yet-despite the entanglement in the decisions, the difficulty
which even courts of last resort in several of the states have had
with the distinction, and the fact that the problem appeared to
so eminent a jurist as Mr. Justice Cardozo to be in such a mud-
die-the rationale of the courts drawing the distinction would
hold the insured to a full knowledge of the distinction and of its
ramifications and implications. Certainly, as a practical matter,
it can safely be said that the average person taking out accident
insurance assumes that he is covered for any fortuitous, unde-
signed injury, and it can hardly be wondered at that the average
person purchasing a policy from an insurance company-even
if such person had the time, acumen, and energy to cope with the
matter thoroughly-has no conception of the judicial niceties of
the problems and no idea of what coverage he is not getting under
the term 'accidental means.' 40
For this reason many courts feel that the term should be given its
ordinary meaning. 1 After all, "[i] t is the layman, not the insurance
attorney, who is insured .... ))42
The third and final justification for distinguishing between the
terms is that by using the term "accidental means" rather than
"accident," the insurance company is attempting to restrict liability.
To fail to distinguish between the terms would be to provide greater
coverage than was intended. While this is undoubtedly the intent
of the insurance company, it is hardly the intent of the ordinary
policyholder. To make the distinction is to assume the insured
intended to make it when, in actuality, he knowns nothing of it.
43
Also, courts should be unwilling, as the Pennsylvania court now is,
"to recognize such a restriction on the basis of the ambiguous lan-
guage . . . which the company knew was susceptible of different
"oAnnot., supra note 14, at 478.
"Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 67 P.2d
80 (1937); Murphy v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N.W.2d 576(1942); Scott v. New Empire Ins. Co., 75 N.M. 81, 400 P.2d 953 (1965);
Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 140, 7 N.E.2d 18 (1937);
Griswald v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 Vt. 367, 180 A. 649 (1935).
2 1A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 5, at 23.
,Annot., supra note 14, at 478.
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interpretations."4 4 To continue to make the distinction would con-
done ambiguity.4 5 By a judicial ruling that the terms are legally
synonymous, the insurer would be forced to clarify the restriction.
The insurer has the power to remove all doubt by using clear and
simple language to explain all policy exclusions.4 6 Also in this
connection, many courts give as a reason for not distinguishing
between the terms the well settled rule that since the insurance com-
pany prepared the contract, it is to be construed strictly against
it in the case of ambiguities and uncertainties.
4 7
For the above reasons, many courts have rejected the strict ap-
proach and there is a definite trend away from it.4" The Pennsyl-
vania court recently decided "to confront the issue directly and to
expressly abandon the artificial distinction. . . ,"' The court noted °
that both Florida5 ' and New Mexico,52 the only courts to consider
the question as one of first impression in the past decade, have
chosen the liberal approach. So definite is the trend that one au-
thority flatly states that the majority of jurisdictions no longer
maintains the distinction.53  In light of the highly unjust result
achieved in Henderson and other North Carolina cases in which
the distinction was applied and recovery denied, and in light of the
fact that the reasons for removing the distinction far outweight the
very tenuous justifications for it, it is submitted that North Carolina
"Beckham v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 424 Pa. 107, 110, 225 A.2d 532, 537
(1967).
"1 Id. at 108, 225 A.2d at 535.
'" Murphy v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N.W.2d 576 (1942);
Scott v. New Empire Ins. Co., 75 N.M. 81, 400 P.2d 953 (1965).
"' Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 67 P.2d
80 (1937); Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 140, 7 N.E.2d 18
(1937); Carter v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259 (1925).
The North Carolina court accepts this well settled rule of insurance law:
"when any provision, condition, or exception is uncertain or ambiguous in
its meaning or is capable of two constructions . . . it should receive that
construction which is most favorable to the insured." Penn v. Standard
Life Ins. Co., 158 N.C. 24, 26, 73 S.E. 99, 100 (1911). However, the court
refuses to admit that the term "accidental means" is ambiguous or capable
of two constructions. In light of all the confusion caused by the term and
the fact that the courts and legal scholars are divided as to its meaning, it
is not understood how the term could be said to be anything other than
ambiguous and uncertain in its meaning.
Kirsch 554.
"Beckham v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 424 Pa. 107, 108, 225 A.2d 532, 535
(1967).10 Id. at 108 n.2, 225 A.2d at 534 n.2.
' Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash, 97 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1957).
Scott v. New Empire Ins. Co., 75 N.M. 81, 400 P.2d 953 (1965).
2 G. RIcH mAs, supra note 4, at 734.
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should cease to allow such a spurious distinction to stand between
the injured insured and the compensation for which he paid his
premium dollar."
PATRIciK H. POPE
Local Government-Airport Not a "Necessary Expense" within
Meaning of Article VII, Section 6, of North Carolina
Constitution
The "necessary expense" exception contained in article VII,
section 6, of the North Carolina Constitution' affords county and
municipal governments limited relief from the onerous burden of
submitting proposed expenditures to a vote of the people before
taxes can be levied and collected or debts contracted. No clear test
exists for determining what expenses of local governments are
necessary, and the North Carolina Supreme Court has proceeded
in catalogue fashion, classing some public functions as necessary
within the meaning of the constitution and others as unnecessary.'
In the recent case of Vance County v. Royster,3 the court de-
clined to overrule thirty years of precedent and declare a public
airport to be a "necessary expense" within the meaning of article
VII, section 6. The decision attracted widespread attention
throughout North Carolina when the Federal Aviation Agency im-
mediately suspended payment on all grant agreements with airports
" See Clifford, Insurance, Survey of N.C. Case Law, 45 N.C.L. REv.
955, 962 (1967) (suggests that it is time for North Carolina to get out of
the "Serbonian Bog").
'No debt or loan except by a majority of voters.-No county,
city, town, or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt,
pledge its faith, or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or
collected by any officers of the same except for the necessary ex-
penses thereof, unless approved by a majority of those who shall
vote thereon in any election held for such purpose. (emphasis added).
Prior to an amendment adopted in the general election of 1948, the last
clause of the section read "unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified
voters therein." The amendment reduces the number of voters necessary
to approve any proposal submitted. Also note that this section was former-
ly section 7 of article VII; by amendment adopted November 6, 1962,
sections 6, 9, and 10 were deleted from article VII, and the remaining
sections numbered accordingly.
2 See Coates & Mitchell, "Necessary Expenses" within the Meaning of
Article VII, Section 7, of the North Carolina Constitution, 18 N.C.L. REv.
93, 94-105 (1940) [Hereinafter cited as Coates].8271 N.C. 53, 155 S.E.2d 790 (1967).
[Vol. 45
